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WALTER HELLERSTEIN

HUGHES v.

OKLAHOMA:

THE

COURT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE,
AND STATE CONTROL OF
NATURAL RESOURCES

The Supreme Court's recent Commerce Clause opinions reflect an
apparent effort to rationalize and modernize the analytical framework for delineating the implied restraints that the Clause imposes
on state legislation. In the state tax field, the Court has articulated
a coherent set of criteria controlling the validity of state taxes on
interstate commerce1 and has discarded doctrine inconsistent with
these standards.2 In the state regulatory context, the Court has like,vise enunciated meaningful decisional principles governing the conWalter Hellerstein is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Georgia.
AuTHoR's NoT-: The author would like to thank Gregory S. Alexander, Jerome
R. Hellerstein, Paul Al. Kurtz, D. Robert Lohn, and Michael Wells for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 99 S. Ct. 1813, 1819-20 (1979);
Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S.
734, 750 (1978); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279, 287
(1977); Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 108 (1975). See also note
80 infra.
2
Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435
US. 734 (1978), overrling Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330
U.S. 422 (1947), and Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Commission, 302
U.S. 90 (1937); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), overruling Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
@ 1980 by The University of Chicago. 0-226-46432-6/80/1979-0005$03.26
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stitutionality of state regulations affecting interstate commerce 3 and
has applied them without substantial concern for their impact on
its precedents of an earlier era. To be sure, not all of the Court's
contemporary Commerce Clause opinions fit easily into the suggested pattern,5 and what appears as a clear pattern may be only a
haphazard arrangement. Hughes v. OklahomaO emerges, however,
as yet another piece in the developing mosaic of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
I. THE HUGHES DECISION
A.

THE FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The essential facts in the case were simple and undisputed.
Through its Wildlife Conservation Code,7 Oklahoma had established
a statutory scheme governing the acquisition, transportation, and
sale of minnows in the State. The Code provided for the licensing
of persons seeking to seine, transport, or sell minnows in the State
for commercial purposes. 8 It imposed no restriction on the number
of minnows a person so licensed was permitted to take from state
waters. The Code stipulated, however, that "[n] o person may transport or ship minnows for sale outside the state which were seined
or procured within the waters of this state."9 The prohibition was
inapplicable to persons "leaving the state possessing three (3) dozen
or less minnows" or to the "sale and shipment of minnows raised
in a regularly licensed commercial minnow hatchery."'" In substance, then, the statute forbade the transportation for out-of-state
3 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Raymond Motor
Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441-42 (1978); Hunt v. Washington
Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 352-54 (1977); Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371-72 (1976); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
4 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-23 (1978); Raymond
Motor Transportation Co. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429,442-43 (1978).
See, e.g., Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Blair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) (taxation);
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (regulation).
6 99 S. Ct. 1727 (1979).
7 Okla. Star. Ann. tit. 29 (West 1974).
8

1d. at § 4-116. Persons acquiring and transporting minnows for their own

use and children under sixteen selling minnows in the counties of their residence
were exempt from these licensing requirements under specified conditions, as
were retailers selling lawfully acquired minnows. Ibid.
I Id. at § 4-115 (B).

10 Id. at § 4-115 (B) (1), (2).

HeinOnline -- 1979 Sup. Ct. Rev. 52 1979

COMMERCE

CLAUSE AND NATURAL RESOURCES

53

sale of large quantities of "natural" (as distinguished from hatcherybred) minnows procured from Oklahoma waters. It did not impose
any limitation on the disposition of hatchery-bred minnows, or on
the procurement or sale of natural minnows within Oklahoma, or on
the out-of-state transportation of natural minnows for purposes
other than sale. Anyone convicted of violating these provisions was
subject to a fine ranging from $100 to $200.11
XWilliam Hughes, a licensed minnow dealer of thirty years' standing under the laws of Texas, carried on a regular commercial minnow business near Wichita Falls, Texas, not far from the Oklahoma
border. In the spring of 1976, Hughes purchased for $350 a load
of natural minnows from an Oklahoma minnow dealer licensed as
such under Oklahoma's Wildlife Conservation Code. On his way
back to Wichita Falls with the load of minnows in his vehicle,
Hughes was arrested by an Oklahoma Game Ranger. He was
charged with "Unlawfully Transporting for Sale Outside of the
State of Oklahoma Minnows Which Were Seined or Procured
within the Waters of Oklahoma ' 1 2 in violation of the Conservation
Code. The parties submitted the evidence to the trial court upon
stipulated facts; the court found Hughes guilty as charged and
fined him $200.
On appeal, Hughes's sole assignment of error was that Oklahoma's
ban on the exportation of minnows violated the Commerce Clause.
He relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Foster-FountainPacking Co. v. Haydel,'3 which struck down a Louisiana statute forbidding the shipment beyond the State of shrimp taken in Louisiana
waters until the heads and shells had been removed. Because the
statute permitted the out-of-state exportation of shrimp after their
heads and shells had been removed (as well as the exportation of
the heads and shells themselves), the Court in Foster-Fountaindetermined that the statute's "purpose is not to retain the shrimp for
the use of the people of Louisiana; it is to favor the canning of the
meat and the manufacture of bran in Louisiana.' 1 4 It concluded
that the law's effect was "directly," i.e., impermissibly, "to obstruct
and burden interstate commerce." 15 In so holding, the Court had

11 d.at §§4-115(D); 4-116(E).
"Hughes v. State, 572 P.2d 573, 574 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
13278 U.S.1 (1928).

4d. at 13.

15 Ibid.
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to distinguish its earlier decision in Geer v. Connecticut, 6 which
sustained over Commerce Clause objections a Connecticut statute
forbidding the transportation outside the State of game birds lawfully killed within the State. The ground of distinction was that
Connecticut had prevented the game from becoming an article of
interstate commerce by requiring it to be retained for consumption
or use in the State, whereas Louisiana allowed "its shrimp to be
taken and all the products thereof to be shipped and sold in interstate commerce," thereby "releas [ing] its hold" on the shrimp and
putting "an end to the trust upon which the State is deemed to own
17
or control the shrimp for the benefit of its people."'
In Hughes, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found Geer
and its progeny rather than Foster-Fountaincontrolling. It reasoned: ' 8
The United States Supreme Court has held on numerous
occasions that the wild animals and fish within a state's borders
are, so far as capable of ownership, owned by the state in its
sovereign capacity for the common benefit of all its people.

Because of such ownership, and in the exercise of its police
power, the state may regulate and control the taking, subsequent use and property rights that may be acquired therein....

Oklahoma law does not prohibit commercial minnow hatcheries within her borders from selling stock minnows to anyone, resident or nonresident, and minnows purchased therefrom may be freely exported. However, the law served to
protect against the depletion of minnows in Oklahoma's natural
streams through commercial exportation. No person is allowed
to export natural minnows for sale outside of Oklahoma. Such a
prohibition is not repugnant to the commerce clause.
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION

The Supreme Court reversed and held that the Oklahoma law
violated the Commerce Clause.'- Repudiating its decision in Geer
v. Connecticut, the Court determined that Oklahoma's statutory
scheme must be evaluated under the same criteria governing the
validity of state regulation of other natural resources, and that, under these criteria, Oklahoma's law could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. Oklahoma never suggested and the Court never
16 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
17278

U.S. at 13.

18 572 P.2d at 575.

19 99 S. Ct. 1727 (1979).
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considered that Congress had, in fact, consented to the statute by
making it unlawful for any person knowingly "to transport. . , in
interstate or foreign commerce, any black bass and other fish, if
such ... transportation is contrary to the law of the State... from
which such black bass or other fish is transported." 20 Indeed, a
similar provision may be read as granting congressional consent
to the result in Geer as well. 21 Thus, Hughes may well have been
wrongly decided in light of Congress' broad power to consent to
state laws that would, in the absence of such consent, impose an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. 2 In any event, Hughes
retains its significance for purposes of the present inquiry as the most
recent expression of the Court's views regarding the negative implications of the Commerce Clause.

1. The overruling of Geer v. Connecticut. The state court's
reliance on Geer as a basis for sustaining Oklahoma's ban on the
transportation of natural minnows for out-of-state sale was fully
understandable. Geer had, after all, upheld over Commerce Clause
objections a prohibition against the transportation beyond the State
of game birds lawfully killed within it. Once the Supreme Court
agreed to hear Hughes's appeal, however, it was apparent that a
defense predicated on Geer would face rough going.
The Court's analysis in Geer was rooted in its understanding of
"the earliest traditions [ofl] the right to reduce animals ferae naturae
to possession, '3 which it gleaned from a reading of Athenian,24
Roman,2 Salic, 26 feudal, 27 and English common law.28 The Court
had reasoned that wild game within a State, until reduced to possession, belonged to the people, who "owned" the game collectively
for the common benefit of all; 29 that the State, as representative of
its citizens, was invested with the authority to exercise the power
2016

U.S.C. § 852 (1976); cf. United States v. Howard, 352 U.S. 212 (1957).

I am indebted to Professor William Cohen of the Stanford Law School for bringing this point to my attention.
21 See 18 U.S.C. § 43 (1976).
2-Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434-36 (1946); In re

Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891); see Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,
769 (1945).
7

U.S. at 522.
24 Ibid.

2

Ibid.

28

Id. at 526-28.

25 Id. at 522-23.

29 Id. at

2161

2GId. at

529.

523-25.
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that was derived from this "common ownership" "as a trust for the
benefit of the people"; 30 that this power could be exercised not only
fo control the taking of game within the State but also to determine
the nature of the property rights acquired in any game so taken; 3
that the power therefore could be employed "to keep the property,
if the sovereign so chooses, always within its jurisdiction for every
33
purpose"; 32 and, that:
The power of the State to control the killing of and ownership in game being admitted, the commerce in game, which the
state law permitted, was necessarily only internal commerce,
since the restriction that it should not become the subject of
external commerce went along with the grant and was part of it.
The Court in Geer proffered a second ground for its determination that Connecticut's embargo on the exportation of game did
not offend the Commerce Clause. The statute represented an appropriate exercise of the State's police power derived from "the
34
duty of the State to preserve for its people a valuable food supply."
The Court declared that the existence of this power was "equally
conclusive" 35 of the outcome of the case as was the existence of
state authority "derived from the common ownership of game and
the trust for the benefit of its people which the State exercises in
relation thereto."3 6 From this one might conclude that the "police
power" rationale was independent of the "common ownership"
rationale. Yet in the next breath the Court inextricably linked the
two theories in observing that the State's police power to protect
its people against adulteration of food carried with it "the existence
of a like power to preserve a food supply which belongs in common
to all the people of the State which can only become the subject of
ownership in a qualified way, and which can never be the object
of commerce except with the consent of the State and subject to
the conditions which it may deem best to impose for the public
37
good."
Whether Geer was predicated on one or two theories, its rationale
(in either configuration) had been discredited by subsequent Su3

oIbid.

31

1d. at 530.
Z Ibid.

33

33Id. at 532.

4Id. at 534.
3

5 Ibid.
-1 Ibid.
3 Id. at 535.
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preme Court cases. The proposition that the State "owned" wild
game within its borders for the common benefit of its citizens had
been undermined by a series of decisions explicitly or implicitly rejecting such a contention. The Court had sustained the exercise of
the federal treaty-making power over migratory birds in the face
of a State's claim that this interfered with the State's ownership and
control of wild animals within its boundaries, and it had remarked
in passing that "[t] o put the claim of the State upon title is to lean
upon a slender reed.""8 It had invalidated a prohibition on the exportation of shrimp taken within state waters until their heads and
shells had been removed, dismissing arguments advanced by the
State on the basis of its alleged ownership of the shrimp.39 It had
struck down a state tax and regulatory scheme that discriminated
against out-of-state commercial shrimp fishermen, disparaging the
"ownership theory" as a legal fiction that stood as a proxy for other
values the State might legitimately pursue, but not by discriminatory
means.4" And, most recently, the Court had repudiated Geer's reasoning by making short shrift of the argument that a State's purported ownership of fish swimming in its territorial waters empowered it to forbid nonresident federal licensees from fishing
41
there:
A State does not stand in the same position as the owner of a
private game preserve and it is pure fantasy to talk of "owning"
wild fish, birds, or animals. Neither the States nor the Federal
Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman or hunter,
has title to these creatures until they are reduced to possession
by skillful capture. ...The "ownership" language of cases such
as those cited by appellant must be understood as no more than
a 19th-century legal fiction expressing "the importance to its
people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource."... Under modern analysis, the question is simply whether the State has exercised its
police power in conformity with the federal laws and Constitution.
Indeed, under the weight of these precedents, the State in Hughes
"I Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,434 (1920).
Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1928). See text
supra, at notes 13-17.
'°Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 339-406 (1948).
41 Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284-85

(1977)

omitted).
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was forced to concede that "State 'ownership' may no longer be
42
acceptable as a descriptive term of valid state interests in wildlife."
Nor had the proposition that the States possessed the power (and,
indeed, the duty) to conserve for their own citizens a valuable local
food supply weathered the ravages of subsequent case law. The
Court had held that States lacked the power to prohibit or limit the
exportation of natural gas in the face of claims advanced by the
States that they possessed "[t] he right to conserve, or . . . reserve,
the resources of the State for the use of the inhabitants of the State,
present and future."4 3 The Court reasoned in these cases that whatever police power the States might have to conserve natural resources located within their borders, this power could not be exercised to limit the shipment or sale of privately owned resources in
interstate commerce merely because they were needed by in-state
consumers. 44 Geer and its progeny were distinguished on the
ground that they involved resources deemed to be owned by the
State 45-a proposition whose erosion was continuing apace with the
dismantling of the broadly conceived conservation rationale. Moreover, as if events were conspiring to augur the impending demise of
Geer, the Court had recently been provided with an opportunity to
match its unkind remarks about Geer's ownership rationale with
similarly critical comments about its conservation rationale. In holding that a State lacked power under the Commerce Clause to forbid
the transportation of waste from other States into privately owned
landfills within the State, the Court cited favorably its "decisions
holding that a State may not accord its own inhabitants a preferred
right of access over consumers in other States to natural resources
' 46
located within its borders.
In Hughes, the Court was faced with the first case "in modem
times to present facts essentially on all fours with Geer.' 4 7 Having
traced the deterioration of Geer's analytical underpinnings, the
Court had no qualms about administering the coup de grace: "We
42

Brief for Appellee, p. 6.
v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 250 (1911); Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 598-99 (1923).
"West, 221 U.S. at 255; Pennsylvania, 262 U.S. at 599.
45 West, 221 U.S. at 253-54. The majority opinion in Pennsylvania, 262 U.S. 553,
did not allude to Geer, although Justice Holmes relied upon it in dissent. Id. at 601.
6City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978).
-799 S.Ct. at 1736.
4

3 West
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now conclude that challenges under the Commerce Clause to state
regulations of wild animals should be considered according to the
same general rule applied to state regulations of other natural re' 48
sources, and therefore expressly overrule Geer.
2. The Court's opinion on the merits. Once it had discarded the
"common ownership" and local conservation rationales underlying
Geer, the Court was compelled to draw upon other principles of
adjudication to resolve the controversy before it. Here the Court
turned to a formulation of the criteria governing the constitutionality of state regulations affecting interstate commerce that has become familiar reading to students of the Court's recent Commerce
40
Clause opinions:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits .... If a legitimate local purpose is
found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend
on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities.
Under these standards, the Court easily concluded that Oklahoma's statutory scheme failed to pass constitutional muster. Rather
than regulating "evenhandedly," the law discriminated on its face
against interstate commerce by blocking the flow of such commerce in natural minnows at the State's borders. 50 After suggesting that discrimination of this nature might give rise to "a virtually
per se rule of invalidity,"5 ' the Court nevertheless proceeded to
4

13Ibid.
4 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citations omitted), quoted
in Hughes, 99 S. Ct.at 1734.
'0See text supra, at notes 7-11. The flow was not blocked entirely; a tricklethree dozen or less natural minnows-could be exported from the State with impunity. Ibid.
"1Hughes, 99 S. Ct. at 1737. The Court did not actually use the quoted phrase
in Hughes, but it had employed the phrase in practically the identical context in
City of Philadelphia v. N wvJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978): "where simple
economic protectionism is effected by state legislation a virtually per se rule of
invalidity has been erected .... The clearest example of such legislation is a law
that overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a State's borders." The
Court in Hughes explicitly referred to this passage from City of Philadelphia.99
S. Ct.at 1737.
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evaluate the justification offered by the State for the discrimination but only under "the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives."52
The "legitimate local purpose" advanced by Oklahoma in de53
fense of the statute was its function as a "conservation measure.1
The Court acknowledged that the State's interest in preserving the
ecological balance in its waters by restricting the removal of large
numbers of minnows might well qualify as a legitimate local purpose. 54 Indeed, the Court was willing to characterize such interests
as "similar to the States' interests in protecting the health and safety
of their citizens,"" interests to which it has traditionally accorded
considerable deference.5 6 But the question under the rubric articulated by the Court was one of degree, and whether the burden imposed by the State on interstate commerce was constitutionally
tolerable would turn not only on the local interest involved but also
on the availability of less burdensome means for achieving the same
ends. The Court was firm in its conviction that the Oklahoma law
failed on this score. The State had "chosen to 'conserve' its minnows
in the way that most overtly discriminates against interstate commerce ... even though nondiscriminatory alternatives would seem
likely to fulfill the State's purported legitimate local purpose more
effectively." 57 Thus Oklahoma had, with a commercially insignificant exception, flatly proscribed the exportation of natural minnows for out-of-state sale, even though it might have pursued its
objectives as well by restricting the number of minnows licensed
dealers could take from state waters or by limiting the way in which
such minnows might be disposed of in the State.581While the Commerce Clause does not require the States to fine tune their legislation to minimize any conceivable impact it might have on interstate
commerce, Oklahoma's effort to conserve its minnows reflected, at
best, an unjustifiable indifference to such impact.
The State attempted to defend the means by which it had chosen
52 99.S. Ct. at 1737.

5 99 S. Ct. at 1737.

53 Brief for Appellee, p. 2.

55 Ibid.
5 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970).
57 99 S. Ct. at 1737.
5
s lbid; see text supra,at notes 7-11.
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to implement its legislative ends by contending that the statutory
scheme embodied a closer fit between means and ends than might
appear at first blush. Oklahoma argued that the ban on commercial
exportation was the most effective means to maintain the desired
ecological balance. The prohibition on transportation for out-ofstate sale, it was claimed, would assure that minnows seined and
sold in Oklahoma would be "returned to Oklahoma waters in the
form of bait," a procedure that served to "accommodate the recreational fisherman, while preserving the habitat and balance of aquatic
wildlife provided by nature.","' The Court dismissed this suggestion
in a footnote.60 It observed that this theory, which the State was
advancing for the first time on appeal, was predicated on factual
assumptions that were unsupported by the record, and it characterized the argument as a "post-hoc rationalization."'" The State's
"bare assertion" 62 was wholly inadequate to overcome the presumptive invalidity of a facially discriminatory statute.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissented from the Court's decision in an
opinion joined by the Chief Justice. Mr. Justice Rehnquist had no
quarrel with the Court's abandonment of the "common ownership"
doctrine of Geer. He would, however, have sustained the Oklahoma statute relying on the principles underlying Geer's "alternative basis"-"that a State, in the exercise of its police power, could
act to preserve for its people a valuable food supply, even though
interstate commerce was remotely and indirectly affected." 63 Apart
from the technical dispute over the independent significance of the
Geer Court's alternative rationale, 4 the crux of the disagreement
between the majority and dissenting opinions was the weight each

3Brief for Appellee, p. 3.
cl 99 S. Ct. at 1737 n.20.
01

62 Ibid.
3 Id. at 1738 n.3.

Ibid.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist was of the view that the Geer Court's "police power"
rationale was independent of its "common ownership" rationale. In light of his
views regarding the scope of this police power, see 99 S. Cc. at 1739-40 and text
infra, at note 65, he saw no reason to overrule Geer. The majority, on the other
hand, relying on the Geer Court's failure to distinguish clearly between the
premises underlying the two rationales, see text supra, at note 37, believed that
the "police power" rationale was simply a corollary of the "common ownership"
rationale. 99 S. Ct. at 1732 n.6. The majority also believed, however, that the
"alternative basis" of Geer (as quoted supra, in the text above and at note 34),
even if viewed independently, had failed to survive subsequent Supreme Court
decisions. See 99 S. Ct. at 1732 n.6 and text supra, at notes 43-46.
64
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gave the State's interest in conservation and the view each held of
what constitutes discrimination against interstate commerce. Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, unlike the majority, would have permitted the
State's "special interest" in preserving wildlife to prevail over Commerce Clause objections unless it represented "a naked attempt to
discriminate against out-of-state enterprises in favor of in-state business unrelated to any purpose of conservation." ' Consistent with
this view, he found no discrimination in the Oklahoma scheme
because the proscription on exportation applied to residents and nonresidents alike, did not protect residents from out-of-state competition, and was not employed as a means of inducing nonresident minnow exporters to shift their business operations into the regulating
State. For the majority, by contrast, the fact that the state regulation substantially obstructed the flow of interstate commerce was
in itself sufficient to condemn the regulation- or at least render
it highly suspect-regardless of whether the obstruction had a differential economic impact on in-state and out-of-state interests.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist carried his dispute with the majority one
step further by asserting, in light of the fact that hatchery-bred
minnows were freely available for exportation, that the record did
not support a determination that interstate commerce in minnows
had been blocked by the Oklahoma legislation. In substance, Mr.
Justice Rehnquist was willing to sustain the statute failing proof
by Hughes that the purchase of hatchery-bred rather than natural
minnows would have been less desirable, more costly, or otherwise
burdensome to his business operations. Mr. Justice Rehnquist would
thus have stood the majority's analysis on its head: while the Court,
having found discrimination on the face of a statute, would impose
upon the State the burden of demonstrating the absence of less
discriminatory means for accomplishing the same ends, he would
impose upon a person subject to a discriminatory statute the burden
of demonstrating the absence of equally efficient alternatives to
avoid its impact.
Viewing the Court's decision in Hughes in isolation, one would
6 99 S. Cr. at 1740. The "Commerce Clause objections" referred to in the text
are those based on the negative implications of the Clause unimplemented by con-

gressional legislation. Mr. Justice Rehnquist recognized that state regulations for
the protection of wildlife would have to yield under other standards, to conflicting
federal statutes and treaties as well as to the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ibid.
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be hard pressed to conclude that it represented a case of much significance. It merely abandoned some quaint and antiquated doctrine
about state "ownership" of wild animals to bring the law governing state regulation of such creatures into conformity with modem
thinking about the constraints imposed by the Commerce Clause on
state regulation of other matters. There are, however, at least two
aspects of the Hughes decision that warrant further consideration.
First, Hughes is the most recent of a series of Supreme Court opinions dealing with the limitations that the Commerce Clause imposes
on state regulation, and its import may be more fully appreciated
when viewed against the background of the Court's contemporary
doctrine in this area. Second, Hughes is a case about state control
over natural resources, a subject whose importance needs no emphasis in an era preoccupied with energy and the environment.
II. COMMERCE CLAUSE RESTRAINTS ON STATE REGULATION:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES

It is a commonplace of modern Commerce Clause analysis
that the Court, in delineating the implied limitations that the Clause
imposes on state legislation, is engaged in a delicate balancing of
state and national interests."' The critical analytical problem, therefore, is to determine how the accommodation between competing
demands of national economic unity and legitimate state policy
is reached. The Court's recent Commerce Clause opinions-of
which Hughes is the latest-suggest that the balancing process is
being undertaken in a more consistent fashion than in the past.
It was in 1970 that the Court first articulated the formulation of
Commerce Clause principles to which it has returned with remarkable regularity ever since. In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,6T an Arizona official had issued an order prohibiting a company from transporting Arizona-grown cantaloupes to California because they had
not been packed according to the requirements of an Arizona statute.
The company had been conducting its packing operations in Calic' This contemporary understanding has been shaped not only by scholarly
commentary, see Dowling, Interstate Commnerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REv.
1, 21-28 (1940); Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version,
47 COLuM. L. REv. 547, 550-552 (1947); Freund, Umpiring the FederalSystem, 54
CoLum. L. REv. 561 (1954); but by judicial opinions as well. See, e.g., Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,770-71 (1945).
67397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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fornia, and it was stipulated that "the practical effect of the [state
official's] order would be to compel the company to build packing
facilities in ...Arizona.'!68 Recognizing that the order "affected"
and "burdened" interstate commerce, and that the critical question
was whether it did so unconstitutionally, the Court unanimously de69
clared:
Although the criteria for determining validity of state statutes affecting interstate commerce have been variously stated,
the general rule that emerges can be phrased as follows: Where
the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then
the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the
burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Occasionally the Court has candidly undertaken a balancing
approach in resolving these issues, but more frequently it has
spoken in terms of "direct" and "indirect" effects and burdens.
Under these standards, the Arizona statute at issue failed to survive
constitutional scrutiny. The State's interest in "promot[ing] and
preserv [ing] the reputation of Arizona growers by prohibiting deceptive packaging"7' carried insufficient weight to offset the nation's interest in unfettered interstate commerce.
As Professor Kurland has observed, Pike was just "[a]n oldfashioned Commerce Clause case" whose outcome was predictable,
and the fact that it even elicited an opinion from the Court may
well have been "testimony to the advocate's skills of appellant's
counsel and little more." 71 Nevertheless, the doctrinal formulation
enunciated in Pike was repeated in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co. v. Cottrell,72 which invalidated a Mississippi regulation banning
6

1d.at 140.
at 142. (Citations omitted.)

69/d.

7

1

70 Id. at 143.

Kurland, Enter the Burger Court: The ConstitutionalBusiness of the Supreme

Court, O.T. 1969, 1970 SUPREME CoUTRT REVIEW 1, 79-80 (1970). The editors of

the Harvard Law Review did not deem the case worthy of comment in their
Supreme Court Note for that year. Note, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84
HARV. L. REV. 32 (1970).
72424

U.S. 366, 371-72 (1976).
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the sale in Mississippi of milk from other States unless such other
States accepted Mississippi milk on a reciprocal basis. The Pike
formulation was cited in Hunt v. Washington State Apple AdvertisingCo7mmission,7 3 which struck down a North Carolina statute
requiring that apples marketed within the State in closed containers
be graded only according to the applicable United States standard.

It was quoted in Raynond Motor Transportation,Inc. v. Rice,7 4
holding unconstitutional Wisconsin regulations governing the
length and configuration of trucks permitted to travel on highways

in the State. It was reiterated in City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey,7 disapproving a New Jersey law prohibiting the importation into the State of most solid or liquid waste collected outside its

territorial limits. And finally, it was set forth in Hughes v. Oklahoma, where it was characterized as "l[t] oday's principle." ' Indeed,
78
with one exception, 77 this catalogue embraces every significant
opinion handed down by the Court over the last decade in which it
has applied the substantive standards 7 derived from the negative implications of the Commerce Clause to state regulation of interstate
80
commerce.
73432 U.S. 333, 350, 353 (1977).
74434 U.S. 429,441-42 (1978).
77

7r437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
7099 S. Ct.at 1734.

Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978)

(upholding over

Commerce Clause objections a state statute forbidding producers or refiners of
petroleum products from owning or operating retail gasoline stations in the state).
711I do not regard either Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978), or
Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974), as "significant." Ray was
a case dealing primarily with federal preemption of state law, see note 80 infra,
and its treatment of the Commerce Clause claim was cursory. See 435 U.S. at
179-80. Allenberg Cotton involved the question whether a foreign corporation
could be denied the right to sue in the State's courts because it had not qualified to
do business there. The essential question was whether the corporation had sufficient
contacts with the State to justify the qualification requirement, and the Court
concluded that it did not. 419 U.S. at 33. Hence the refusal by the State to honor
and enforce the contracts of an exclusively interstate business was deemed to violate
the Commerce Clause. Id. at 34.
In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), the Court upheld a
Maryland statutory scheme involving the payment to scrap processors by the
States of cash bounties
that favored in-state processors in alleged violation of the
Commerce Clause. The Court held that the negative implications of the Commerce Clause were not applicable to the scheme at issue, although the Court did
advert to the Pike
formulation in passing. Id. at 804-05. The case is discussed in text
144-49.
infra,at notes
10 The generalization in the text is not directed to two categories of cases which
sometimes share common doctrinal themes with, but are in significant respects
distinct from, the cases that are the subject of this article. First, the Court's opinions
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Before we consider what this development may signify, it may
be useful as a preliminary matter to establish what it does not signify.
First, it does not signify any substantive departure from the standards the Court has employed in the past in adjudicating Commerce
Clause attacks on state regulation. Indeed, every one of the elements

of the Pike test can be found explicitly or implicitly in many of
the Court's prior opinions.8s Nor does adoption of the Pike test-

if adoption it be-promise greater precision in judgment or predictability of outcomes than in the past. The Commerce Clause balance
will continue to be struck substantially as it has always been struck
addressing Commerce Clause limitations on state taxation may refer to the regulatory cases and the principles underlying them. See, e.g., Boston Stock Exchange
v. State Tax Commission, 429 U.S. 318, 328-29, 335-36 (1977). Nevertheless, the
controversies in this area frequently involve issues that are unique to the exercise
of state tax power, see generally HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL
TAXATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 237-335, 391-454, 662-92 (4th ed. 1978), and
generally cannot be fruitfully assimilated with the regulatory cases for purposes
of analysis. It might be noted, however, that the Court has enunciated and reiterated
a set of decisional principles governing the validity of state taxes on interstate
commerce, a development that may loosely be seen as parallel to the development
in the regulatory context. See id. at 249, 287; notes I & 2 supra; Blumstein, Some
Intersections of the Negative Commerce Clause and the New Federaliml: The
Case of Discriminatory State Income Tax TreatmWent of Out-of-State Tax-exempt
Bonds, 31 VAND. L. REv. 473 (1978); Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Suprene
Court: Tow'ard a More Unified Approach to Constitutional Adjudication?, 75
MIcH. L. REV. 1426, 1441-52 (1977).
Second, the Court's opinions confronting questions of federal preemption of
state law may draw on principles one ordinarily associates with the negative
implications of the Commerce Clause, especially in cases in which those implications might have provided an alternative ground of decision. See Douglas v.
Seacost Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 285-87 (1977); Morrison, The Right to Fish
for Seacoast Products: Gibbons v. Odgen Resurrected, 1977 SUPREXE COURT REVIEw 239, 246-50 (1977); Note, Pre-emnption as a Preferential Ground: A New
Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208, 219-21 (1959). Nevertheless, federal
preemption cases usually involve considerations quite different from those derived
solely from the negative implications of the Commerce Clause, and the discrete
analytical framework within which preemption cases are adjudicated reflects these
differences. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977). To be sure,
if a preemption claim is rejected, the Court must in many instances squarely confront a claim based entirely on the implied restraints of the Commerce Clause. See,
e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 620-21 n.4 (1978). But
if the Commerce Clause claim has in substance been disposed of through the resolution of the preemption question, it is likely to be given short shrift. See, e.g., Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 179-80 (1978).
"'See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443
(1960). ("Evenhanded local regulation to effectuate a legitimate local interest is
valid unless. . . unduly burdensome on ... interstate commerce"); Dean Milk Co.
v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (State cannot exercise "its unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its people" in a discriminatory
fashion "if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are available").
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by conscientious judges, by a careful weighing of the competing
state and national interests in light of all the facts and circumstances
of the case. 2 Vhether a consumer protection law limiting the grading of apples marketed in the State to "U.S. grades" satisfies the
standards of Pike83 can scarcely tell us whether a highway safety
law forbidding the operation in the State of trucks longer than
fifty-five feet will do So. 8 4 At most, the fluid criteria of Pike provide a framework for Commerce Clause analysis; they provide no
litmus test of constitutionality."5
Still, it would be wrong to dismiss the Court's repeated invocation of the Pike formulation as merely an accident of opinion drafting or a prefunctory nod to doctrinal consistency. The Court's recent Commerce Clause opinions stress common themes that are
reflected in the Pike formulation and the patterns of emphasis are
worthy of note. First, the Court has been more forthright than in
the past in accepting its own role of making the "delicate adjustment of the conflicting state and federal claims''86 required by the
Commerce Clause. The open acknowledgment that it is balancing
interest 87 and the explicit weighing of the competing considerations88 tend to illuminate the Commerce Clause calculus. As a result,
82

FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL,

21-22, 33-34 (1964 ed.).
8
3 Hunt, 432 U.S. 333.

8

TANEY AND WArrE

4 Raymond Motor,434 U.S. 429.

Indeed, a textual analysis of the Pike formulation raises many more questions
than it answers. Thus the formulation does not tell us when a statute regulates
"evenhandedly," see note 102 infra and accompanying text, nor what constitutes a
"legitimate local public interest," nor what kinds of effects on interstate commerce are "incidental." It does not tell us whether a statute's failure to meet any
one of these tests necessarily means that it is unconstitutional, or whether one
must continue to balance state and national interests, but with altered presumptions. See text infra, at notes 103-06. And it does not tell us what respect is to be
accorded to various local interests nor how to determine whether an alternative
scheme might promote such interests "as well." See text infra, at notes 89-93 and
107-10. This is not meant to suggest, however, that the Pike formulation was designed to answer any of these questions. See generally Blasi, ConstitutionalLimitations on the Power of States to Regulate the Movement of Goods in Interstate
Connnerce 18-21, paper presented at the Conference on the Judicial Role in
Economic Integration, Bellagio, Italy, July 17-21, 1979 (to be published).
"IH.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 553 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting), quoted in Cottrell, 424 U.S. at 371, and Raymond Motor, 434 U.S. at 440.
57
Pike, 397 US. at 142; Cottrell, 424 U.S. at 371-72; Hunt, 432 U.S. at 350, 353;
Raymond Motor, 434 U.S. at 441-43; City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624; Hughes,
99 S. Ct. at 1734, 1736.
Si Pike, 397 U.S. at 145-46; Cottrell, 424 U.S. at 375-76; Hunt, 432 U.S. at 351-54;
Raymond Motor, 434 U.S. at 444-46; Hughes, 99 S. Ct. at 1737-78.
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we may speak with more confidence about the narrow principle for
which a particular case stands as well as the Court's view of the
relative importance of various state interests. For example, it seems
fair to conclude from Pike itself that a State's legitimate interest in
preserving the reputation of a local industry is less substantial than
the nation's interest in permitting business operations to be performed at their most efficient locations."9 Moreover, we know that
the State's interest asserted in Pike is less substantial in the Court's
eyes than the State's interest in the safety, health, or employment of
its citizens.90 We have also been told in recent opinions that the
State's interest in safety ranks high in the Court's constellation of
values,9 ' that highway safety may enjoy an especially exalted
status, 92 and that the State's interests in conservation and protection
of wild animals are "similar" to its interest in health and safety."
Second, the Court's apparent conviction that the Pike formulation embodies the controlling criteria for adjudicating contemporary Commerce Clause controversies is evidenced by its willingness
to repudiate doctrine and precedent inconsistent with the Pike standards. In Raymond Motor, the Court emphatically rejected Wisconsin's contention, based on earlier cases,94 that "the general rule
of Pike is not applicable to a State's regulation of motor vehicles
in the promotion of safety"9 and that "the inquiry under the Commerce Clause is ended without a weighing of the asserted safety
purpose against the degree of interference with interstate commerce."9 6 In City of Philadelphia,the Court rejected New Jersey's
contention, based on earlier cases,9 7 that innately harmful articles
such as wastes were "not legitimate subjects of trade and commerce" 98 and therefore fall outside the pale of Commerce Clause
8

9Pike, 397 U.S. at 143, 145-46.

91Raymond Motor, 434 U.S. at 443.

0

92

9 Id.at 143, 146.

Ibid.

93

Hughes,99 S. Ct. at 1737.
E.g., South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S.
177 (1938).
94

9

Raymond Motor, 434 U.S. at 442.

96Id. at 443. This was not the first time the Court had rejected such a claim. See
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 528-29 (1959). As to the application of

"the general rule of Pike" in the highway safety context, see note 118 infra.
97

9

E.g., Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 125 U.S. 465 (1888).

1Id. at 489, quoted in City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 622.
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protection and the general principles set forth in Pike. "All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection; none
is excluded by definition at the outset."99 And in Hughes, the Court
overruled Geer and thus brought Commerce Clause challenges to
state regulation of wild animals under "the same general rule applied to state regulatio [n] of other natural resources,"' 100 namely,
the rule of Pike.1' 1
Third, the Court has focused considerable attention on two substantive aspects of the Pike formulation in resolving the disputes
before it. The first is one that has always been a critical factor in
Commerce Clause analysis: whether the state law, on its face or in
effect, regulates "evenhandedly." Although there is nothing in its
opinions to suggest that the Court is drawing brighter lines than
10 2
in the past between "evenhanded" and discriminatory legislation,
the Court has made it clear that when, in its judgment, a state law
fails to accord "evenhanded" treatment to interests protected by
the Commerce Clause, the consequences are pratically inevitable.
Thus when a state law "overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a State's borders," 0 3 "a virtually per se rule of invalidity
has been erected."' 4 At the very least, once a determination is
made that a state law discriminates against interstate commerce, the
State is under a heavy burden to demonstrate that the local interest
allegedly justifying the discrimination could not be effectuated by
less discriminatory means.105 If, on the other hand, the Court determines that a statute regulates "evenhandedly," its chances of
surviving constitutional scrutiny are greatly enhanced. 08
The other substantive aspect of the Pike formulation which has
played a key role in recent Commerce Clause cases is the Court's
searching evaluation of the alternatives available to the State to
achieve its purported objectives when the means the State has actu100 Hughes, 99S. Ct. at 1736.
1 City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 622.
Id. at 1734.
101 Compare Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978), 'with
Hunt, 432 U.S. 333; see note 77 supra; Blumstein, note 80 supra, at 501-08; Note,
101

The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REv. 57, 66-75 (1978).
103 City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624.

10 4 lbid; see also Hughes,99 S. Ct. at 1737.
105 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353; Hughes, 99 S. Ct. at 1736.
100 See text supra,at note 70.
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ally chosen are found to be burdensome or discriminatory. The
Court noted in Cottrellthat Mississippi had "the obvious alternative
of applying its own standards of inspection to shipments of milk from
a nonreciprocating State,'1 0 7 instead of completely barring such

shipments. It noted in Hunt that North Carolina could effectuate
its goal of protecting consumers from fraud or confusion "by permitting out-of-state growers to utilize state grades only if they also
marked their shipments with the applicable U.S.D.A. label,"'' 08 instead of insisting on the exclusive use of the latter. And it indicated
in Hughes that Oklahoma might have achieved its conservation objectives by limiting the numbers of minnows that could be taken
from state waters by licensed dealers rather than through its choice
of a method "that most overtly discriminates against interstate commerce."' 9 Although the consideration of less burdensome alternatives is not novel Commerce Clause jurisprudence,"' the Court
seems to be weighing this factor in the balance with greater care
and consistency than before."1
There are yet further indicia not directly identifiable with the
Pike formulation which also suggest that the Court's reiteration of
a single test embodying its approach to Commerce Clause questions
is not mere happenstance. Four of the six decisions invoking the
Pike standard were unanimous;"12 in the other two, only the Chief
Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissented." 3 Moreover, the
Court's opinions were written by four Justices who span the Court's
ideological spectrum." 4 One may reasonably conclude that whatever is going on is going on with a substantial degree of consensus.
As I indicated earlier, it is important to resist the temptation to
107 Cottrell,424 U.S. at 377.
109 Hughes, 99 S.
Ct.at 1737.
108 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 354.
110
See note 81 supra.
111 See Note, State Enviromnental Protection Legislation and the Conmnerce
Clause,87 HARV. L. REv. 1762, 1781 (1974).
11Pike, 397 U.S. 137; Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (Stevens, J., did not participate);
Hunt, 432 U.S. 333 (Rehnquist, J., did not participate); Raymond Motor, 434
U.S. 429 (Blackmun, J., joined in the opinion of the Court, but wrote a concurring
opinion joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Brennan and Rehnquist, see note
118 infra; Stevens, J., did not participate).
113 City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. 617, Hughes, 99 S. Ct. 1727.
114 Chief Justice Burger (Hunt); Mr. Justice Stewart (Pike and City of Philadelphia); Mr. Justice Brennan (Cottrell and Hughes), and Mr. Justice Powell
(Raymond Motor).
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see more in the Court's opinions than is actually there. We must not
forget that the Court has written Commerce Clause opinions in recent years that do not conform precisely to the suggested pattern;"rl
that, in any event, the pattern embodies little that is new from a
doctrinal standpoint; 1"6 and, more generally, that the Court in deciding Commerce Clause cases today is not doing anything fundamentally different from what it has always done in resolving these
controversies. 117 Furthermore, even assuming that the Pike formulation embraces the criteria the Court has presently adopted for adjudicating Commerce Clause cases, the formulation is sufficiently
imprecise that the result of its application to particular disputes remains highly uncertain." 8 Nevertheless, while there may be less
in these opinions than meets the eye, they do attest to the Court's
achievement of an increased measure of doctrinal consistency in an
important area of constitutional law.
III. COMMERCE CLAUSE RESTRAINTS ON STATE CONTROL OF

NATURAL RESoURcES

If a new war is going to be fought over the control and exploitation of the nation's natural resources," 9 the Supreme Court
will surely be an important battleground. Although such conflicts
are nothing new to the nation or the Court,' 20 they have acquired
special significance in an age of anxiety over shortages of energy
and other natural resources. The problem, of course, is not limited
to controversies in which the States themselves are the face-to-face
115 See notes 77-79 supra.
See note 81 supra.
'17 See text supra,at notes 66 and 82.
118 Indeed, Mr. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Raymond Motor,
434 U.S. at 448-51, which three other Justices joined, supports the view that the
Court's reliance on the Pike standard in different contexts does not mean that
the Court is striking a similar balance in each case. Mr. Justice Blackmun opined
that "if safety justifications are not illusory, the Court will not second-guess legislative judgment about their importance in comparison with related burdens on interstate commerce." Id. at 449. Of course, the general point seems implicit in the
Pike formulation itself.
11"See, e.g., "The Second War between the States," BUsINEss WEEK 92-114 (May
17, 1976); but see Pack, Frostbelt and Sunbelt: Convergence over Time, 4 INTERGOVERNMIENTAL PERSPECTIVE 8-15 (Fall 1978).
120
See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 76 (1907).
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combatants, although we have recently witnessed our share of
these. 12 More frequently the conflict arises, as in Hughes v. Oklahoma, in the form of a dispute between a private party seeldng to
use a resource and a State that has imposed limitations on its use.
Whatever questions there may once have been about the nature of
the restraints that the Commerce Clause imposes on state control
of natural resources, Hughes and other Supreme Court decisions of
recent vintage' 22 have enunciated a number of propositions that,
for the moment at least, can be regarded as settled. Some of these
propositions represent a simple application of the Pike formulation
to natural resource regulation; others relate to specific issues arising
in the natural resource context. The apparent harmony among
members of the Court regarding the proper approach to many problems it has confronted in connection with natural resource regulation has not, however, led to a resolution of all of them.
A.

STATE CONTROL OF PRIVATELY OVNED NATURAL RESOURCES

The implied restraints imposed by the Commerce Clause on state
control of privately owned natural resources are in principle identical to the Commerce Clause restraints imposed on other aspects of
state regulation. A statute regulating privately owned natural resources must do so "evenhandedly." It may not discriminate against
interstate commerce by preventing the shipment of the resource
outside the State, 23 by restricting access to the resource from outside the State, 124 or by providing that in-state demands for the
resource be accorded preference over out-of-state demands. 2 The
needs of local consumers for privately owned natural resources
located within a State, even if they constitute legitimate local public
interests, do not justify discriminatory legislation. 2 6 Although the
Court could conceivably be persuaded to sustain such legislation in
121Maryland v. Louisiana, No. 83 Orig., Motion for leave to file bill of complaint
granted, 99 S. Ct. 2876 (1979); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978).
12 City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. 617; Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978);
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); Douglas v. Seacoast
Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
123West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
124 City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. 617.
25
126

Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928).
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the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives capable of achieving
the same objective, the burden of persuasion on the State in this
context seems well nigh insuperable. 2 7
Evenhanded regulation of privately owned natural resources, on
the other hand, is quite likely to withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny. The States have a legitimate local interest in conserving natural
resources located within their borders, 128 and it is an interest that
ranks high in the Court's hierarchy of legitimate local purposes.' 29
Since the burden that evenhanded regulation imposes on interstate
commerce will be tolerated unless it is "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits,"' 30 such regulation of natural
resources will generally be sustained even if its effect is to increase
the price'3 or decrease the supply 13 2 of the resource.133 The possibility that the regulation may be economically inefficient ordinarily
gives rise to no substantial constitutional objection.3 The Constitution did not enact Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations any more
35
than it enacted Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.
B. STATE CONTROL OF STATE-OWNED NATURAL RESOURCES

When the focus shifts from privately owned natural resources to
those that are owned by the State, the Commerce Clause analysis
becomes considerably more problematic. Indeed, in holding in City
127 Hughes, 99 S. Ct. at 1736-38; City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 626-27; see text
supra at notes 103-05.
12
Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
2
' " Hughes,99 S. Ct. at 1737.
130 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
131 Cities Service Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179.

232 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 367 (1943).
13 3 The results of a number of earlier cases are consistent with the statement
in the text, although the reasoning underlying them does not reflect modem Commerce Clause analysis. For example, Commerce Clause objections to state statutes
regulating the production of natural gas were routinely dismissed on the ground
that production was a local activity distinct from interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 235 (1932). In
these cases, the Court gave more serious attention to the claim that the statutes
violated the resource owners' economic due process rights, but these claims too
were generally rejected. See, e.g., ibid; see also Summers, The Modern Theory and
PracticalApplication of Statutes for the Conservation of Oil and Gas, 13 TULANE
L. REv. 1 (1938); Note, The Constitution and State Control of Natural Resources,
64 HARv. L. REv. 642, 644 (1951).
'" 4 Exon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124-29 (1978); see
TRIBE, AMIERICA N CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 25 (1979 Supp.).
135 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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of Philadelphia that New Jersey could not bar the importation of
out-of-state waste into privately owned landfills in the State, the
Court explicitly declined to express any "opinion about New Jersey's power, consistent with the Commerce Clause, to restrict to
state residents access to state-owned resources."' 1 6 There is little
direct guidance from the Court regarding the limitations that the
Clause imposes on state control of such resources, and, as indicated
below, what guidance there is does not all point in the same direction.
It must be stressed from the outset that the references to the
State's ownership interest in a natural resource as an organizational
principle should not be taken to suggest that the State's ownership
interest is necessarily a critical or, in some instances, even a helpful
concept for purposes of analyzing the limitations that the Commerce
Clause imposes on state control of natural resources. As will be seen,
the nature of the State's ownership interest in a natural resource is
generally only one of several factors to be considered in the Commerce Clause calculus. Still, it does seem useful, at least as a starting
point of analysis, to distinguish between two types of situations involving state control of natural resources that are not privately
owned. First, there are cases in which the State possesses interests
in natural resources which, if they were held by a private person,
would be regarded as amounting to substantial ownership, as, for
example, a State's interest in trees growing on state lands. Second,
there are cases in which the State's interest, even if characterized in
terms associated with ownership, would ordinarily be regarded as
significantly more limited, as, for example, a State's interest in
water running in intrastate streams.
If a State enjoys conventional ownership rights in a natural resource, two (sometimes overlapping) considerations emerge that
seem to limit the application of the Commerce Clause principles
established with regard to state control of privately owned natural
resources. First, there is the notion that the Commerce Clause does
not require a State to spend state funds, provide state services, or
otherwise distribute its resources-whether natural or man-madeto in-state residents and businesses and out-of-state residents and
businesses on a nondiscriminatory basis. 137 Second, when a State

13r
437 U.S. at 627 n.6.

137 See

text infra, at notes 139-43.
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is acting as a purchaser or seller in-as distinguished from a regulator
of-the market, there is authority to suggest that it is not restrained
by the negative implications of the Commerce Clause. 3" Both of
these considerations and their impact on the Commerce Clause require further elaboration.
The proposition that the State may, at least in some circumstances, favor resident individuals and businesses in the distribution
of state resources without violating the Constitution would seem
to be a logical corollary of the basic assumptions underlying our
federal system. "If," to take an example from McCready v. Virginia,3 ' "Virginia had by law provided for the sale of its once vast
public domain, and a division of the proceeds among its own people,
no one, we venture to say, would contend that the citizens of other
States had a constitutional right to the enjoyment of this privilege
of Virginia citizenship."' 40 Nor, it may be suggested, would anyone
venture to say that such action would be proscribed by the negative
implications of the Commerce Clause. Whatever limitations the
Constitution in general and the Commerce Clause in particular impose on the ability of the States to discriminate in favor of local interests and to prevent nonresidents from becoming residents, 14 ' it
is difficult to imagine these limitations extending so far as to bar the
States from making any distinctions between in-state and out-ofstate interests in distributing state resources without destroying the
essential fabric of our constitutional plan. Although the principle
that a State may favor its own in the distribution of state resources
without running afoul of the Commerce Clause has arguably been
accorded implicit sanction in the few cases that have presented the
issue, 4 2 the Court has formally maintained a posture of neutrality
regarding a State's "power, consistent with the Commerce Clause
... to spend state funds solely on behalf of state residents and busi143
nesses."'

1"1 See text infra, at notes 144-49.
139 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
140 Id. at 395-96.
141- And these are substantial. See text infra, at notes 159-76.
142 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), discussed in text
infra, at notes 144-49; American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 409 U.S. 904, aff'g, 339
F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (sustaining over Commerce Clause objections
statute requiring that all public printing be done in the State).
143

City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 627 n.6.
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The Court has been explicit, however, in approving the doctrine
that the Commerce Clause imposes no restraints on the State when
it enters the marketplace as a purchaser, and the State is therefore
free under the Clause to favor in-state residents and businesses when
spending state funds in that capacity. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 44 the Court upheld a Maryland statute designed to encourage the disposal of abandoned automobiles through payments of
cash bounties to scrap processors. The Court found that the statute
did not violate the Commerce Clause, even though the distribtuion
of the bounties favored in-state interests.' 4 ' The Court recognized
that it was confronted with a "situation . . . without precedent in
this Court."'146 It distinguished previous cases in which a State had
sought to "interfer[e] with the natural functioning of the interstate
market either through prohibition or through burdensome regulation"' 47 from the case before it in which the State had simply "entered into the market itself" "as a purchaser, in effect, of a potential
article of interstate commerce."' 48 And it concluded that "[n] othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a
State ... from participating in the market and exercising the right
49
to favor its own citizens over others."'
Whatever may be the limits of these two related but analytically
distinct principles," 50 their logic suggests that the Commerce Clause
144

426 U.S. 794 (1976).

145 To be eligible for the bounty, scrap processors were required in some in-

stances to provide documentation of title to the junk automobiles. The documentation requirements for out-of-state processors were more burdensome than those
imposed on processors with plants in Maryland.
47
426 U.S. at 807.
1 Id. at 806.
148 Id. at 806, 808.
149 Id. at 810. Most other courts that have considered Commerce Clause challenges to resident preferences in state purchasing or contracting have likewise rejected them, sometimes resting their conclusions on the perceived distinction between a State's governmental functions, which were thought to be subject to the
negative strictures of the Commerce Clause, and its proprietary functions, which
were not. See, e.g., American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 725 (M.D.

146

Fla. 1971), aff'd, 409 U.S. 904 (1972); Schrey v. Allison Steel Manufacturing Co.,

75 Ariz. 282 (1953); Tribune Printing & Binding Co. v. Barnes, 7 N.D. 591, 597
(1898); but see Garden State Dairies, Inc. v. Sills, 46 N.J. 349 (1966), noted in 80
L. REv. 1357 (1967); see generally Comment, In-State Preferences in Public
Contracting:States' Rights Versus Economic Sectionalism, 49 U. CoLo. L. REv. 205,

HARV.

216-22 (1978). In other cases, the fact that the benefits were financed largely
by the resident's own tax dollars was thought to be important. See, e.g., Reeves,
Inc. v. Kelley, 586 F.2d 1230, 1233 (8th Cir. 1978), discussed infra, at notes 177-86.
150

And there are definite limits to them. In addition to those discussed below,
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would not prevent a State from distributing or selling state-owned
natural resources to in-state residents or businesses on a preferential
basis. And this is a sound conclusion. While one may be troubled
by some of its implications' 51 and dissatisfied with the analysis by

which some courts have reached it,'52 the opposite conclusion would
be even more disturbing. To preclude the States from preferring instate interests in the distribution of state natural resources would
deprive the States of an important attribute of their separate ex-

istence as independent political units in the federal system. 53 The
denial to the States of the power to provide for their residents as
such would undermine the relationship between the States and
their residents. Moreover, forbidding the States from preferring

their own in the distribution of their resources would introduce
into the federal system an unsettling asymmetry between the respective obligations the resident and nonresident owe to the State

and the benefits they enjoy there. 154 Whether it would be good

national policy to deny the States the power to favor in-state inter-

ests in this context and whether Congress in pursuit of such policy
see text infra, at notes 159-75, it is worth noting that the Court has dismissed
arguments that the States may discriminate against interstate commerce in their
regulation of state highways because of the State's ownership interests in the
roads. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925); see also South Carolina State
Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187-89 (1938); cf. West
v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 261-62 (1911); see generally Linde Constitutional Rights in the Public Sector: Justice Douglas on Liberty in the Welfare
State, 40 WVASH L. REV. 10, 49-67 (1965). Although the State is plainly acting as
a regulator in this context, if there were no limits to the theory that the State
could favor in-state interests in distributing state-owned resources, one might
contend that the State is simply providing a state-owned resource, a highway, to
in-state interests on a preferential basis. The Court's unwillingness to brook State
discrimination against instrumentalities of interstate commerce regardless of any
asserted ownership interest by the State in their highways simply underscores the
point made earlier in the text that state ownership, standing by itself, is no talisman
of Commerce Clause analysis.
'S' See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 795, 817-18, 828-29
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Linde, note 150 supra; Note, State Purchasing
Activity Excluded from Coninerce Clause Review, 18 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv.
893 (1977).
1,-2The governmental-proprietary distinction, see note 149 supra, has been a
darling of academic criticism. See, e.g., DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA-TSE
§ 25.07 (1958); PROSSER, HAmBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 131, at 979, 982 (4th
ed. 1971); see generally Wells & Hellerstein, The Govermnental-ProprietaryDistinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 66 VA. L. REV. (April 1980).
1=3 Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
r'4 See Hellerstein, Some Reflections on the State Taxation of a Nonresident's
Personal Income, 72 MiCn. L. REV. 1309, 1318-19 (1974).
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could legislate to that end'5 5 are, of course, different questions. The
only question here is whether the Commerce Clause by its own
force withdraws this power from the States. While the Commerce
Clause may have been designed to create a national common market,
it would take more than a "great silence"' 5 6 to sever the special relationship between a State and its in-state residents and businesses.'
It is important to recognize, however, that the suggested conclusion, even if correct, is a narrow one. It does not tell us whether
the disposition of state-owned natural resources on a preferential
basis to in-state residents and businesses would pass muster under
other contitutional provisions, although it seems likely that it
would.Y5 8 Nor does it indicate the force of two limiting principles,
whose impact is substantial. First, whatever distinctions the State
may make between in-state and out-of-state interests with regard
to the allocation of the State's natural resources, it is plain that it
has only minimal powers to deny anyone the right to become a
resident of the State or to accord him less than the full panoply of
privileges it accords its long-time residents. 59 If a New Yorker
55

See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. 833.
151
H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
157 Cf. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 408 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
15" Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (in-state preference in distribution of
cash subsidies no violation of Equal Protection Clause); Starns v. Malkerson, 401
U.S. 985 (1971), aff'g, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), and Sturgis v. Washington,
414 U.S. 1057, aff'g, 368 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Wash. 1973) (resident preference in
tuition rates at state universities no violation of "right to travel" or Equal Protection Clause); see also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452-53 (1973); cf. Heim
v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915), and Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915)
(resident preference in public employment no violation of Equal Protection or
Due Process Clauses). Although the Court has expressed some doubt about the
continuing vitality of Heim and Crane, see Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531
n.15 (1978), it would appear that they are still good authority for the proposition
that a State may favor its own residents over nonresidents with regard to state
employment, even if the State may not favor those of its own residents who are
American citizens over aliens, whether resident or nonresident. Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); C.D.R. Enterprises, Ltd. v. Board of Educ., 412
F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd sub nomi. Lefkowitz v. C.D.R. Enterprises,
Ltd., 429 U.S. 1031 (1977); see Note, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 57, 83 n.47 (1978). But cf. Ambach v. Norwick, 99 S.Ct. 1589 (1979); Foley
v.Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). See generally Rosberg, Protecting the Right of
Free Movement of Persons in the United States, 87-93, 100-02, paper presented at
the Conference on the Judicial Role in Economic Integration, Bellagio, Italy, July
17-21, 1979 (to be published).
59 See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); but
see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); see generally Rosberg, note 158 supra, at
50-68.
3
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wants to enjoy the benefits Alaska may be bestowing upon its residents as a result of its ownership of vast amounts of oil, there is little
more than the price of transportation to prevent him from doing so.
Second, the power the States may have to discriminate in favor of
their in-state residents and businesses in the distribution of stateowned natural resources does not permit the States to attach
conditions to the use or disposition of the resource that might independently burden interstate commerce or some other constitutionally protected interest. While Alaska may be able to sell its oil to
residents at a preferred price, it may not, as the Court recently
informed us in Hicklin v. Orbeck,10 compel "all businesses that
benefit in some way from the economic ripple effect of Alaska's
decision to develop its oil and gas resources to bias their employment practices in favor of the State's residents."'0 1
In Hicklin, the Supreme Court struck down under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause an Alaska statute requiring that residents be
preferred over nonresidents with regard to "all employment which
is a result of oil and gas leases, easements, leases or right-of-way
permits for oil or gas pipeline purposes ... to which the state is a
party."'10 2 One of the grounds on which Alaska sought to defend
the statute was that it owned all of the oil and gas with respect to
which the employment preferences were required, and that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause was inapplicable to "decisions by
the states as to how they would permit, if at all, the use and distribution of the natural resources which they own.'1 3 The Court responded: 164
We do not agree that the fact that a State owns a resource, of
itself, completely removes a law concerning that resource
from the prohibitions of the Clause.... Rather than placing
a statute completely beyond the Clause, a State's ownership
of the property with which the statute is concerned is a factor
-although oftien the crucial factor-to be considered in evaluating whether the statute's discrimination against noncitizens
violates the Clause.
The State's ownership was not enough to justify the discrimination
in Hicklin because Alaska had "little or no proprietary interest in
160 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
V02 Alaska

161

d. at 531.

Star. § 38.40.050 (a) (1977), quoted at 437 U.S. 529.

103 Brief for Appellee, p. 20 n.14, quoted at 437 U.S. 528.
161437 U.S. at 528-29.
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much of the activity swept within the ambit of [the statute]""' and
"the connection of the State's oil and gas with much of the covered
activity [was] sufficiently attenuated so that it cannot justifiably be
the basis for requiring private employers to discriminate against
nonresidents."' 16
Hicklin was decided under the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
which in some instances provides an alternative to the Commerce
Clause as a basis for constitutional adjudication.6 7 The analytical
route by which a decision is reached under the two Clauses, however, is ordinarily quite different.' Even so, the Court in Hicklin
specifically relied on "the mutually reinforcing relationship"'",, between the Privileges and Immunities and Commerce Clauses in an
extensive dictum invoking precedents under the latter to bolster
its conclusion under the former. The Court referred to its decisions
establishing that the Commerce Clause forbade the States from attempting to preserve for their own residents the benefits of privately
owned natural resources located within their borders.17 It went on
to observe that in Foster-FountainPacking Co. v. Haydel,'7' involving Louisiana's prohibition on the out-of-state shipment of
shrimp prior to local processing, the Court had limited the implications of the still vital doctrine of Geer-that Louisiana's purported
ownership of the shrimp justified the State's discrimination in favor
of in-state interests. The Court in Foster-Fountainhad found that
165 Id. at

529.
166
Ibid.
167 Cf. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (1870). Notwithstanding the occasional
overlap, there are considerable differences in the scope of the two Clauses. The
Privileges and Immunities Clause affords no protection to corporations, Paul v.
Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1868), and thereby has no application to many enterprises
engaged in interstate commerce. Moreover, even though a state law does not discriminate against nonresidents, so that no objection to it could plausibly be raised
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, it might still be offensive to the Commerce Clause. Cf. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (nondiscriminatory highway-safety regulation).
116
Compare, e.g., Pike, 397 U.S. 137, 'with Hicklin, 437 U.S. 518. In contrast to
the Court's internal agreement over the governing decisional principles in the
Commerce Clause context, there is continuing disagreement among members of
the Court regarding the proper approach to Privileges and Immunities questions.
Compare Hicklin, 437 U.S. 518, 'with Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission, 436
U.S. 371 (1978); see TRBE, supra note 134, at 34-40.
69437 U.S. at 531.
70
Id. at 532, discussing West, 221 U.S. 229, and Pennsylvania, 262 U.S. 553;
see text supra, at notes 43-46 and 123-25.
171 278 U.S. 1 (1928). See text supra, at notes 13-17.
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"by permitting its shrimp to be taken and all the products thereof
to be shipped and sold in interstate commerce, the State necessarily
releases its hold and, as to the shrimp so taken definitely terminates
its control." 17" ' Based on its reading of all these cases, the Court
73
concluded that: 1
the Commerce Clause circumscribes a State's ability to prefer
its own citizens in the utilization of natural resources found
within its borders, but destined for interstate commerce. Like
Louisiana's shrimp in FosterPacking,Alaska's oil and gas here
are bound for out-of-state consumption ...Although the fact
that a state-owned resource is destined for interstate commerce does not, of itself, disable the State from preferring its
own citizens in the utilization of the resource, it does inform
analysis under the Privileges and Immunities Clause as to the
permissibility of the discrimination the State visits upon nonresidents based on its ownership of the resource.... [T]he
breadth of the discrimination mandated by [the statutel goes
far beyond the degree of resident bias Alaska's ownership of
the oif and gas can justifiably support.
Although the Court in Hicklin was only incidentally concerned
with the Commerce Clause, several inferences regarding its view
of the restraints the Clause imposes on state control of state-owned
natural resources may fairly be drawn from its remarks. The Court
is apparently of the view that the Commerce Clause imposes some
limits on a State's ability to prefer in-state residents and businesses
in the utilization of state-owned natural resources destined for interstate commerce. Foster-Fountain,which the Court treated in the
same breath as the "private ownership" cases, might have been
dismissed as a case involving the "fiction" of state ownership in
which the Court had enunciated a rule that was consistent with
the reality of private control. But in Hicklin it was clear that Alaska
owned the oil and gas as much as it is capable of owning anything. 7 4
Yet the analogy the Court drew between Foster-Fountainand
Hicklin leaves little doubt that it would strike down on Commerce
Clause grounds restrictions on state-owned natural resources of the
type Louisiana sought to impose on the commercial exploitation of
its shrimp. Thus any ban or conditions on the private sale, use, or
exportation of a state-owned natural resource favoring in-state in172

278 U.S. at 13, quoted at 437 U.S. at 533.

173437

U.S. at 533.

74

1

Id. at 528 n.1l.
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terests would very likely be invalidated. On the other hand, the
Court did allow that "the fact that a state-owned resource is destined for interstate commerce does not, of itself, disable the State
from preferring its own citizens in the utilization of that resource."' 175 The Court thereby reinforced the central conclusion
advanced above, namely, that the Commerce Clause does not forbid
the States, at least under some conditions, from favoring in-state
residents and businesses in the allocation of state-owned natural resources.
Finally, and perhaps as a useful reminder of the unsettled state of
the law in this area, the most recent word from the Court bearing
on these issues injects a distinct element of uncertainty with regard
to its views. In Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley,'17 the South Dakota Cement
Commission, created by the state legislature to carry out the manufacture, distribution, and sale of cement as "works of public necessity and importance, ' 177 refused to sell cement to out-of-state customers in accordance with its policy of supplying all South Dakota
customers first. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, reversing the decision of the district court, held that the
Commission's action did not violate the Commerce Clause. Relying
principally on the Supreme Court's decision in Hughes v. Alex17
andria Scrap Corp., the court observed that:
South Dakota has not attempted to pass any regulation or prohibition on any private industry functioning in commerce. It
has simply acted in a proprietary capacity as a seller of cement
within the interstate cement market.
The court refused to attribute any significance to the fact that
Maryland was a purchaser in Alexandria Scrap, whereas South Dakota was a seller in the case before it, on the reasonable premise
that the holding in Alexandria Scrap was rooted in the distinction
between the State's participation in and its regulation of the market,
not in the distinction between inward- and outward-moving commerce. 79 And it concluded: ISO
While a state is similar to private business when it participates
in the market in a purely proprietary capacity, it is also some17-1437 U.S. at 533.

178Id. at 1232.

176 586 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1978).

1

7

17 Id. at 1231.

79

Id. at 1233 n.4.
180 Id. at 1233 (citations omitted).
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what different. As a government providing a public service and
utilizing the money and resources of its residents, it has a right
and perhaps even an obligation to consider their common good
and conserve their resources so long as it does not do so by attempting to regulate or control commerce among the states....
The factual background in these cases does not indicate that
South Dakota has attempted to control channels of interstate
commerce. Accordingly, we hold the commerce clause does
not prohibit the State of South Dakota "from participating in
the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens
over others." Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. Cf. American
Yearbook Co. v. Askew.
The unsuccessful purchaser petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari and, three weeks after its decision in Hughes v. Oklahoma,
the Court issued the following order::
Petition for writ of certiorari granted, judgment vacated and
case remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Hughes v. Oklahoma.... 181
The Court's reference to Hughes v. Oklahoma is puzzling. From a
doctrinal standpoint, Hughes did little more than extinguish what
little life was left in the fiction of state ownership of wildlife located within its borders and thus brought the framework for adjudicating state regulation of such wildlife into line with the general principles of Pike and the privately owned natural resource
cases. But South Dakota's ownership of the cement at issue in Reeves
was not based on any fiction. It was like Alaska's gas and oil in
Hicklin. Perhaps, as Hicklin suggests, there are Commerce Clause
limits on what South Dakota may do with its cement. But unless
Hughes v. Oklahoma in some mysterious way undermined Hughes
v. Alexandria Scrap, it is difficult to see the precise bearing that a
case dealing with a State's regulation of wildlife owned by nobody
has on a case dealing with a State's sale of cement owned by the
State.
There are, however, other plausible explanations of the Court's
cryptic remand. First, the Court may not have been concerned
about the precise bearing of Hughes v. Oklahoma on Reeves, Inc. v.
Kelley. It might have been trying to make the more general point
to the Court of Appeals that a State's alleged ownership of a resource-fictional or actual-is but one of many factors to be taken
181 99 S. Ct. 2155

(1979).
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into account in the Commerce Clause balance and that the court
had accorded too much weight to the fact of state ownership. If
this is what the Court is saying, however, it would seem on the facts
presented to signal a retreat from the implications of Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp. Second, it' is possible that the Court really
perceives no constitutional distinction between the "private" and
"public" ownership cases. One would, however, expect the Court
to be more explicit in articulating its position on this matter, especially in light of its specific discussion of the issue in earlier cases.', 2
Third, it is possible that the Court viewed the South Dakota Cement
Commission as more of a regulator of than a participant in the
market, although the record below does not provide much support
for this position. Finally, it is possible that the Court viewed the
case as presenting difficult issues that were likely to arise only in
rare instances. By remanding the case, the Court might have hoped
to receive further illumination about the problem or, alternatively
and perhaps preferably, to have it disappear. On remand, the Court
18 3
of Appeals adhered to its earlier holding.
C. STATE CONTROL OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN WHICH OWNERSHIP

INTERESTS ARE NOT CLEARLY ESTABLISHED

The discussion in the preceding two subsections was addressed
to cases of state control of natural resources in which ownership of
the resource, whether private or public, was clearly established
under conventional property-law concepts. There is, however, a
third category of cases involving state control of natural resources
such as wildlife, water, and air in which ownership interests, if
they exist at all, are often not well established.
In Hughes v. Oklahoma the Court was dealing with wildlife, a
natural resource that in its view was owned by no one. "[I] t is pure
fantasy to talk of 'owning' wild fish, birds, or animals. Neither the
182 See text supra,at

notes 136 and 162-73.

" 3 Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley, 603 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1979). The court found Hughes

v. Oklahoma distinguishable because South Dakota had not prevented privately
owned articles of trade from being shipped in interstate commerce. "We conclude
that [South Dakota's] action is more similar to Maryland's preference for its residents in its entry into the automobile scrap processing market, upheld in Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., than conduct at which the prohibitions of the Commerce
Clause have historically been directed." Reeves sought Supreme Court review of
the Court of Appeals' decision on remand, 48 L.W. 3310 (Nov. 6, 1979),
and, at this writing, its petition for certiorari was awaiting Supreme Court action.
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States nor the Federal Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman or hunter, has title to these creatures until they are reduced to

possession by skillful capture."'184 In thus repudiating the "19thcentury legal fiction" of state ownership,""" the Court concluded
that "challenges under the Commerce Clause to state regulations
of wild animals should be considered according to the same general
rule applied to state regulations of other natural resources."' 8 6 What

the Court meant, of course, was the same general rule it had applied
to state regulation of privately owned natural resources. Although

one might have argued as an original proposition that the State
should be accorded greater leeway in controlling unowned than
privately owned natural resources, the Hughes opinion contains
little evidence that a distinction between the two types of cases
may properly be drawn. 1 7 If, therefore, a determination is made
that a claim of state ownership to a resource is a "fiction," it seems
fair to infer from Hughes that state regulation of the resource must

satisfy the criteria of Pike, and no special weight will be attributed
to the absence of private ownership. Hence game birds, 8 natural minnows,8 9 shrimp, 90 and other free-roaming'
and freeswimming'9 2 creatures, whose peculiar constitutional status has long
184 99 S. Ct.at 1735-36, quoting Douglas,431 U.S. at 284.
18 99 S. Ct.at 1736.

186 Ibid.
137Mr. Justice Rehnquist expressed the "hope" that some of the principles he

thought were controlling may have survived the overruling of Geer, 99 S.Ct. at
1379 (see text supra, at notes 63-65), but his references to those statements in the
Court's opinion acknowledging the power and interest of the States to protect
and conserve wildlife within their borders provide scant basis for such optimism.
The State's power to conserve natural resources located within their borders
through evenhanded measures has been a consistent theme in the Court's opinions
dealing with privately owned natural resources. See text supra, at notes 123-33.
While the Court declared that the States' interests in conserving wildlife were
"similar" to their interests in protecting the health and safety of their citizens, 99
S. Ct. 1737, it might well reach the same conclusion regarding the States' interests
in conserving privately owned natural resources. See text supra, at notes 123-33.
188 Geer, 161 U.S. 519; cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
9
' Hughes, 99 S. Ct. 1727.
°00 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Foster-FountainPacking, 278 U.S. 1.
191 Cf. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); Kleppe v.
New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); Lacoste v. Louisiana Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545 (1924); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
292 Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 722 (1936); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891); cf. Douglas v. Seacost Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265
(1977); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Lawton v.
Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894); see generally Morrison, note 80 supra, at 250-55.
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commanded the Court's attention, are now apparently to be treated
substantially the same as privately owned natural resources for pur19 3
poses of Commerce Clause adjudication.
Once one leaves the area of wildlife, however, the terrain becomes less certain. Two cases handed down by the Court in the
heyday of nineteenth-century legal fictions suggest some of the difficulties likely to be encountered in this context under contemporary
Commerce Clause analysis. In McCready v. Virginia,'94 a Maryland resident, who had planted oysters in Virginia's inland tidewaters, was convicted of violating a statute forbidding nonresidents from planting oysters in Virginia waters. Over MacCready's
objections that the prohibition violated the Privileges and Immunities and Commerce Clauses, the Court sustained the conviction. Dismissing the latter claim on the ground that production is not commerce, 195 the Court devoted its principal attention to the former.
It began with the "settled" doctrine that "each State owns the
beds of all tide-waters within its jurisdiction . . . [and] the tidewaters themselves."' 96 "For this purpose," the Court continued, "the
State represents its people, and the ownership is that of the people
in their united sovereignty."'19 7 The Court therefore reasoned that
the State: 19
has the right to appropriate its tide-waters and their beds to
be used by its people as a common for taking and cultivating
fish.... Such an appropriation is in effect nothing more than a
regulation of the use by the people of their common property.
193 This is not to suggest, however, that every state law that would pass constitutional muster as an evenhanded regulation of wildlife would likewise survive
constitutional scrutiny as a regulation of privately owned resources. A law forbidding any hunting of certain animals might well be sustained as an evenhanded
conservation measure; a law forbidding any production of oil from privately
owned wells would raise more difficult constitutional issues. This may simply be
another way of saying that the Court's decision in Hughes has not divested the States
of their traditional role as managers of wildlife located within their borders, so
long as such management is undertaken on a nondiscriminatory basis.
i 9 4 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
9
I Id. at 396-97. McCready also argued that the statute was preempted by federal
laws "relating to the coast trade," id. at 394, but the Court did not explicitly address this contention. The Court's decision in Douglas, 431 U.S. 265 (1977), may
be read as casting some doubt on the continuing validity of the Court's disposition
of this issue in McCready. See Lewis & Strand, Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.:
The Legal and Economic Consequences for the Maryland Oystery, 38 MD. L. REv.
1,8 (1978); see also note 80 supra.
19G 94 U.S. at 394.
'7 Ibid.
198 Id. at 395.
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In light of these principles, and the premise that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause "extended only to such privileges and immunities
as are 'in their nature fundamental; which belong of right to the
citizens of all free governments,' "I" the Court had no hesitation in
concluding that Virginia had not denied a Maryland resident a
"privilege" or "immunity" of citizenship by confining the use of
Virginia's oyster beds to its own residents. "We think we may
safely hold that the citizens of one State are not invested by this
clause of the Constitution with any interest in the common property
of the citizens of another State. 20 0
From a doctrinal standpoint, McCready has unquestionably been
eroded. Production may not be commerce, but its regulation by
the State will be limited by the negative implications of the Commerce Clause if such production substantially affects commerce
among the States. 0 1 It may be that only "fundamental" rights are
protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause,20 2 but the Court
today might strike down the Virginia statute under that Clause as
an impermissibly pervasive discrimination against nonresidents to
achieve whatever goals it may permissibly pursue as a consequence
of its ownership of the resource.20 3 Moreover, the Court has repeatedly asserted that " It] he whole ownership theory, in fact, is
now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to
20 4
preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource."
For some or all of these reasons, most observers have routinely concluded that McCready is "anachronistic," 20 5 subject to "significant
20 7
doubts,"""0 and "a derelict on the sea of legal history."
19 Ibid., quoting Corfield v. CoryelI, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (Case No. 3,230) (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1825).
200 94 U.S. at 395.
201 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 359-68 (1943); cf. United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-23 (1978).
202
See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
2 03

Hicklin, 437 U.S. 518.

2

04Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 402 (1948).

20

Note, Domicile Preferences in Employment: The Case of Alaska Hire, 1978

Du~rL.J. 1069,1076 (1978).
20 0

HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 278 (1978).
note 80 supra, at 252. Professor Morrison was referring generally
to the "Corfield category of special interests," ibid., which was embodied in the
holding of McCready.Id. at 252 n.72.
NowAK, ROTUNDA, & YOUNG,

2017Morrison,
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Perhaps so. But McCready may not be ready for last rites. The
Commerce Clause 208 would today impose some limits on the restrictions Virginia might place on the use of its tidelands. The central question, however, is whether those limits are the same as the
restraints imposed on its control of wildlife or whether they are
more akin to the limits imposed on its control of state-owned natural resources, which contemplate the possibility of some in-state
preferences, without regard to the availability of nondiscriminatory
alternatives. The discrediting of the "common ownership" doctrine
does not necessarily resolve the issue. That doctrine has been maligned largely in cases involving the State's claim to ownership of
wildlife which, as a practical matter, nobody owned.2 09 But tidelands are arguably analytically distinct from fish and birds. The
States have an interest in their tidelands which, while distinguishable
from A's fee interest in Blackacre, may nevertheless be characterized as a substantial one. 210 Hence, even if the "common ownership" theory on which the State's claims were originally predicated
has no place in contemporary Commerce Clause analysis-whether
wildlife or tidelands are at issue-it does not necessarily follow that
the consequences in each instance are the same. Exposure of the
fiction of "common ownership" of game may lead to the conclusion that in reality it is owned by no one and that the Commerce
Clause criteria governing privately owned natural resources should
therefore apply.21' But exposing the fiction of "common ownership" of tidelands may reveal that in reality the State's ownership
20S With regard to the Privileges and Immunities Clause, it is quite possible that
the Court would reach a different conclusion in McCready today for the reason
suggested above. See text supra, at note 203. Some support for the continuing
vitality of the holding of McCready, however, may be found in Baldwin v. Fish &
Game Commission, 436 U.S. 371, 383, 386 (1978) (sustaining Montana's elk-hunting
license scheme which discriminated against nonresidents) and in parts of the following discussion.
209
Hughes, 99 S. Ct. 1727, 1735-36 (minnows); Baldvin, 436 U.S. 371, at 385-86
(elk); Douglas, 431 U.S. 265, at 284 (fish); Toomer, 334 U.S. 385, at 401-02
(shrimp); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (birds); cf. Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, at 265 (1891) (fish).
21oSee Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE LJ. 762 (1970); the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-15 (1976) (conveying to the States "title," "ownership," and "the right
and power to manage, administer, lease, develop and use" the lands beneath the
oceans and natural resources within state territorial jurisdiction); and Douglas, 431
U.S. at 284-85.
211 See text supra,at notes 184-93.
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interest is significant, and that the appropriate analogy for Commerce Clause purposes would be to state mineral holdings or state
forests rather than wildlife. There is considerable learning and controversy concerning the States' interest in the tidelands, 212 and no
claim to expertise is being made here. The point is only that tidelands may be different from wildlife with regard to the reality of
state ownership and its recognition for Commerce Clause pur213
poses.
A second factor that might bear on the determination whether
Virginia's oyster beds should be treated differently from unowned
resources under the Commerce Clause is the extent to which the
State itself had acted as a proprietor of the resource. If the States
had expended large sums of money to develop, manage, and cultivate
oyster beds located in state waters, one might regard the entire
enterprise as a "statewide oyster 'farm' ",214 subsidized by the State,
to which access might reasonably be limited to in-state residents
and businesses under the principle discussed in the preceding subsection.
While these factors could breathe some new life into McCready,
there are countervailing considerations that should not be ignored.
The general drift of Supreme Court doctrine in this area has been
toward greater freedom in the interstate market,21 5 and, when the
case is close, "free trade" interests are likely to prevail over the
States' interests in providing for their own, which are easily portrayed as forces of "economic Balkanization. 21 8 Moreover, in dealing with the tidelands, the Court may feel it is dealing with a resource that is impressed with a national interest,2 1 7 and it thus might
be particularly vigilant in protecting the resource from local economic prejudice. Finally, even if some concession to the States'
"I"
See, e.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), and sources cited
therein; see also note 210 supra.
213
Vhatever the impact the States' "ownership" of their tidelands under 43
U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (see note 210 supra) on the negative implications of the Commerce Clause, the Court made it clear in Douglas that such "ownership" did not
permit them to limit the rights of federal licensees, who are nonresidents of the
State, to fish in their waters. It has been suggested, however, that the statutory
preemption in Douglas was "only the old negative implications of the Commerce
Clause in a new guise." Morrison, note 80 supra, at 250; see note 195 supra.
214
Lewis & Strand, note 195 supra, at 13-14.
215 See text supra,at notes 70-80.
2.1"
Hughes,99 S. Ct. at 1731.
217 See notes 210 and 212 supra.

HeinOnline -- 1979 Sup. Ct. Rev. 89 1979

90

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

ownership interest in their tidelands is made, it must be kept in
mind that the States are confined in their ability to translate this
ownership interest in a resource into restrictions that would independently burden the Commerce Clause.218 Indeed, in Johnson v.
Haydel,21 9 a companion case to Foster-Fountain, the Court invalidated Louisiana's attempt to impose, with respect to oysters it
claimed to own, restrictions similar to those it had sought to impose
on the interstate shipment of shrimp. Whatever limits Virginia may
'still be able to impose on access to its oyster beds under a refurbished
version of McCready, it surely may not impose any limitations on
the disposition of oysters taken from those beds, beyond those limitations that are permissible as applied to a privately owned resource.
Like their interest in oyster beds located within their jurisdictions, the States' interest in water situated within their borders may
be strong enough to raise questions regarding their power over the
resource that cannot be disposed of merely by reference to cases
involving wildlife. In Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter,0
the Court upheld a New Jersey statute making it unlawful for anyone to export "the waters of any fresh water lake, pond, brook,
creek, river or stream of this State into any other State, for use
therein."'221 Over objections predicated on the Contract, Commerce,
Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities
Clauses, the Court sustained an injunction against a water company under contract with the City of New York to prevent the
company from carrying waters of a New Jersey river outside the
State. Without deciding whether the State could prohibit the acquisition of large quantities of water from state streams in its capacity as "owner" of the bed of the stream and of all rights in the
water not belonging to riparian proprietors,2 22 the Court preferred
to rest its decision "upon a broader ground... [that] is independent
of the more or less attenuated residuum of title that the State
may be said to possess. ' 222 In substance, the Court held that the
State's "police power.. . . to protect the atmosphere, the water
and the forests within its territory, ' ' 224 authorized it "to maintain
2

8

See text supra,at notes 160-75.

219 278

U.S. 16 (1928).

220 209 U.S.349 (1908).
221

222

Id. at 354.

223 Id. at
224

355.

Ibid.

Id. at 353.

HeinOnline -- 1979 Sup. Ct. Rev. 90 1979

COMMERCE CLAUSE AND NATURAL RESOURCES

91

the rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit. '' 22 The Court relied in part on Geer's "preservation" rationale, 226 as well as on Geer's holding that a State might
qualify the property interest one receives in a resource to prevent
22 7
it from becoming an object of interstate commerce..
Like McCready, Hudson County has suffered serious erosion
from a doctrinal point of view. The general proposition that a State
may "preserve" natural resources located within its borders by forbidding their exportation or by qualifying the property interest
that private parties acquire in such resources was finally laid to rest
with the overruling of Geer. While the State's alleged "ownership"
of the water might have provided an independent ground for such
a holding, the Supreme Court, as noted, explicitly refused to rest
its decision on that ground. 228 By its own terms, then, Hudson
County represents a precedent of doubtful validity.
But what about its outcome? If the New Jersey statute were defended today on the ground that New Jersey's ownership interest
in the water was sufficient to remove it from the rules of the privately
owned resource cases, which it clearly could not survive, would the
statute nevertheless withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny? I should
think not. Even if a State enjoyed conventional ownership rights in
a natural resource, thus implicating the rules applicable to state control of state-owned resources, it seems highly unlikely for reasons
suggested above229 that an absolute bar on the exportation of the
resource is the type of preference for in-state interests that might
be tolerated on the basis of state ownership. But Hudson County is
an easy case.230
Id. at 356.
Ibid. See text supra,at notes 34-37.
227 209 U.S. at 357. See text supra, at notes 23-33. Notnvithstanding the Court's
disclaimer of relying on state ownership of the resource as the basis of its decision,
223

220

see text supra, at notes 222-23, its reliance on this aspect of Geer suggests that

"common ownership" principles were nevertheless informing the Court's thinking.
28 The New Jersey courts, however, had done so. McCarter v. Hudson County
Water Co., 70 N.J.Eq. 525 (1905), aff'd, 70 N.J.Eq. 695 (1906).
22 See text supra,at notes 160-75.
2"Indeed, in Carr v. City of Alms, 385 U.S. 35, aft'g, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D.
Tex. 1966), the Court cast doubt on the holding of Hudson County by summarily
affirming the decision of a three-judge federal district court which held unconstitutional a Texas statute forbidding the shipment outside the State of water
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Suppose New Jersey limited to in-state residents and businesses
access to all waters in the State, subject to preexisting private rights
in such waters. Would this pass constitutional muster? The issue
could only be resolved by analysis of the complex and confusing
problems associated with state "ownership" of water- 31 to determine
whether the appropriate analogy for purposes of Commerce Clause
analysis is to wildlife or to state lands or to something else. Again,
no claim is made here to any expertise in the field of water rights.
The point to be made is a narrow one that state control of water,
like control of oyster beds, raises questions under the Commerce
Clause that have not been answered by Hughes v. Oklahoma. Moreover, these questions, while arising in cases that can be viewed as
curious relics from the distant past, may surface in the future in connection with existing state legislation that embodies their holdings. '
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court's decision in Hughes v. Oklahoma reflects and
reinforces its general approach to Commerce Clause limitations on
state regulation. The interment of the artificial exception to this
approach that had been associated with the notion that a State
"owns" its wildlife is a sound development,2" although the result
in Hughes may be questioned in light of congressional legislation
withdrawn from underground sources within the State. The district court, "[elonsidering the statute in question only with regard to whether it regulates the transportation and use of water after it has been withdrawn from a well and becomes
personal property" concluded that such water was like any other privately owned
property and that the natural gas cases, see notes 123 and 125 supra,were controlling.
Id. at 839. But see West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 258-60 (1911)
(distinguishing Hudson County); see generally Comment, "It's Our Water!"-Can
WVyoming Constitutionally Prohibit the Exportation of State Waters?, 1975 LAND
&WATER REV. 119.

231See Trelease,
Riv. 638 (1957).

Govermnent Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAuw. L.

232 See, e.g., Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. §§ 4-1003, 1004(b), considered in Lewis
& Strand, note 195 supra, at 2 nn. 3 and 4; Wyo. Stat. § 41-10.5, considered in Comment, note 230 supra.
233The common-trust doctrine has application far beyond the negative implications of the Commerce Clause, for example, as a basis for state standing to assert
the common interests of its citizens in environmental and other litigation. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1336-37 (D.P.R.
1978). There is nothing in Hughes to suggest that these applications of the
common-trust doctrine are affected by the Court's decision.
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arguably consenting to laws like Oklahoma's. 4 The confidence
with which the Court disposed of the controversy in Hughes, moreover, cannot obscure the significance of the underlying conflict between the nation's interest in unfettered commerce among the States
and the States' interest in controlling the disposition of their natural
resources, a conflict that extends far beyond the question of whether
Oklahoma may keep natural minnows within its borders. Lurking
behind the "fictions" of State ownership, which the Court found
so easy to abandon in Hughes, are realities of state ownership that
present much harder cases.
2-34See text supra, at notes 20-22.
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